## osmocom.org - FOSS for mobile comms community based Free / Open Source Software for communications

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#### Outline

- Researching communications systems
- Bootstrapping Osmocom
- The Osmocom project

## About the speaker

- Using + toying with Linux since 1994
- Kernel / bootloader / driver / firmware development since 1999
- IT security expert, focus on network protocol security
- Former core developer of Linux packet filter netfilter/iptables
- Board-level Electrical Engineering
- Always looking for interesting protocols (RFID, DECT, GSM)
- OpenEXZ, OpenPCD, Openmoko, OpenBSC, OsmocomBB, OsmoSGSN



### Research in TCP/IP/Ethernet

Assume you want to do some research in the TCP/IP/Ethernet communications area,

- you use off-the-shelf hardware (x86, Ethernet card)
- you start with the Linux / \*BSD stack
- you add the instrumentation you need
- you make your proposed modifications
- you do some testing
- you write your paper and publish the results



# Research in (mobile) communications

Assume it is before 2009 (before Osmocom) and you want to do some research in mobile comms

- there is no FOSS implementation of any of the protocols or functional entities
- almost no university has a test lab with the required equipment. And if they do, it is black boxes that you cannot modify according to your research requirements
- you turn away at that point, or you cannot work on really exciting stuff
- only chance is to partner with commercial company, who puts you under NDAs and who wants to profit from your research



#### GSM/3G vs. Internet

#### Observation

- Both GSM/3G and TCP/IP protocol specs are publicly available
- The Internet protocol stack (Ethernet/Wifi/TCP/IP) receives lots of scrutiny
- GSM networks are as widely deployed as the Internet
- Yet, GSM/3G protocols receive no such scrutiny!
- There are reasons for that:
  - GSM industry is extremely closed (and closed-minded)
  - Only about 4 closed-source protocol stack implementations
  - GSM chipset makers never release any hardware documentation



# The closed GSM industry Handset manufacturing side

- Only very few companies build GSM/3.5G baseband chips today
  - Those companies buy the operating system kernel and the protocol stack from third parties
- Only very few handset makers are large enough to become a customer
  - Even they only get limited access to hardware documentation
  - Even they never really get access to the firmware source



# The closed GSM industry Network manufacturing side

- Only very few companies build GSM network equipment
  - Basically only Ericsson, Nokia-Siemens, Alcatel-Lucent and Huawei
  - Exception: Small equipment manufacturers for picocell / nanocell / femtocells / measurement devices and law enforcement equipment
- Only operators buy equipment from them
- Since the quantities are low, the prices are extremely high
  - e.g. for a BTS, easily 10-40k EUR

# The closed GSM industry Operator side

- Operators are mainly banks today
- Typical operator outsources
  - Network planning / deployment / servicing
  - Even Billing!
- Operator just knows the closed equipment as shipped by manufacturer
- Very few people at an operator have knowledge of the protocol beyond what's needed for operations and maintenance



# GSM is more than phone calls

#### Listening to phone calls is boring...

- Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communication
  - BMW can unlock/open your car via GSM
  - Alarm systems often report via GSM
  - Smart Metering (Utility companies)
  - GSM-R / European Train Control System
  - Vending machines report that their cash box is full
  - Control if wind-mills supply power into the grid
  - Transaction numbers for electronic banking

# The closed GSM industry Security implications

The security implications of the closed GSM industry are:

- Almost no people who have detailed technical knowledge outside the protocol stack or GSM network equipment manufacturers
- No independent research on protocol-level security
  - If there's security research at all, then only theoretical (like the A5/2 and A5/1 cryptanalysis)
  - Or on application level (e.g. mobile malware)
- No open source protocol implementations
  - which are key for making more people learn about the protocols
  - which enable quick prototyping/testing by modifying existing code



# The closed GSM industry My self-proclaimed mission

Mission: Bring TCP/IP/Internet security knowledge to GSM

- Create tools to enable independent/public IT Security community to examine GSM
- Try to close the estimated 10 year gap between the state of security technology on the Internet vs. GSM networks
  - Industry thinks in terms of walled garden and phones behaving like specified
  - No proper incident response strategies!
  - No packet filters, firewalls, intrusion detection on GSM protocol level
  - General public assumes GSM networks are safer than Internet



#### To actually do research on GSM, we need

- detailed knowledge on the architecture and protocol stack
- suitable hardware (there's no PHY/MAC only device like Ethernet MAC)
- a Free / Open Source Software implementation of at least parts of the protocol stack

# Bootstrapping GSM Research

How would you get started?

If you were to start with GSM protocol level security analysis, where and how would you start?

- On the handset side?
  - Difficult since GSM firmware and protocol stacks are closed and proprietary
  - Even if you want to write your own protocol stack, the layer
     1 hardware and signal processing is closed and undocumented, too
  - Publicly known attempts
    - The TSM30 project as part of the THC GSM project
    - mados, an alternative OS for Nokia DTC3 phones
  - none of those projects successful so far



# Bootstrapping GSM research

How would you get started?

If you were to start with GSM protocol level security analysis, where and how would you start?

- On the network side?
  - Difficult since equipment is not easily available and normally extremely expensive
  - However, network is very modular and has many standardized/documented interfaces
  - Thus, if BTS equipment is available, much easier/faster progress

# Bootstrapping GSM research

The bootstrapping process

- Read GSM specs (> 1000 PDF documents, each hundreds of pages)
- Gradually grow knowledge about the protocols
- Obtain actual GSM network equipment (BTS)
- Try to get actual protocol traces as examples
- Start a complete protocol stack implementation from scratch
- Finally, go and play with GSM protocol security

# Osmocom / osmocom.org

- Osmocom == Open Soruce Mobile Communications
- Classic collaborative, community-driven FOSS project
- Gathers creative people who want to explore this industry-dominated closed mobile communications world
- communication via mailing lists, IRC
- soure code in git, information in trac/wiki
- http://osmocom.org/

## OpenBSC<sup>1</sup>

- first Osmocom project
- Implements GSM A-bis interface towards BTS
- Supports Siemens, ip.access, Ericsson and Nokia BTS
- can implement only BSC function (osmo-bsc) or a fully autonomous self-contained GSM network (osmo-nitb) that requires no external MSC/VLR/AUC/HLR/EIR
- deployed in > 200 installations world-wide, commercial and research

# OpenBSC test installation




# OsmoSGSN / OpenGGSN

- extends the OpenBSC based network from GSM to GPRS/EDGE by implementing the classic SGSN and GGSN functional entities
- OpenGGSN existed already, but was abandoned by original author
- Works only with BTSs that provides Gb interface, like ip.access nanoBTS
- Suitable for research only, not production ready

#### **OsmocomBB**

- Full baseband processor firmware implementation of a mobile phone (MS)
- We re-use existing phone hardware and re-wrote the L1,
   L2, L3 and higher level logic
- Higher layers reuse code from OpenBSC wherever possible
- Used in a number of universities and other research contexts





#### OsmocomTETRA

- SDR implementation of a TETRA radio-modem (PHY/MAC)
- Rx is fully implemented, Tx only partial
- Can be used for air interface interception
- Accompanied by wireshark dissectors for the TETRA protocol stack

### **OsmocomGMR**

- ETSI GMR (Geo Mobile Radio) is "GSM for satellites"
- GMR-1 used by Thuraya satellite network
- OsmocomGMR implements SDR based radiomodem + PHY/MAC (Rx)
- Partial wireshark dissectors for the protocol stack
- Reverse engineered implementation of GMR-A5 crypto
- Speech codec is proprietary, still needs reverse engineering

### OsmocomDECT

- ETSI DECT (Digital European Cordless Telephony) is used in millions of cordless phones
- deDECTed.org project started with open source protocol analyzers and demonstrated many vulnerabilities
- OsmocomDECT is an implementation of the DECT hardware drivers and protocols for the Linux kernel
- Integrates with Asterisk

#### OsmocomOP25

- APCO25 is Professional PMR system used in the US
- Can be compared to TETRA in Europe
- OsmocomOP25 is again SDR receiver + protocol analyzer

#### **OsmoSDR**

- small, low-power / low-cost USB SDR hardware
- higher bandwidth than FunCubeDonglePro
- much lower cost than USRP
- Open Hardware
- Developer units available



#### rtl-sdr

- re-purpose a USD 20 DVB-T USB dongle based on Realtek chipset
- deactivate/bypass DVB-T demodulator / MPEG decoder
- pass baseband samples via high-speed USB into PC
- no open hardware, but Free Software



### **OsmocomSIMTRACE**

- Hardware protocol tracer for SIM phone interface
- Wireshark protocol dissector for SIM-ME protocol (TS 11.11)
- Can be used for SIM Application development / analysis
- Also capable of SIM card emulation and man-in-the-middle attacks



#### Osmo-E1-Xcvr

- Open hardware project for interfacing E1 lines with microcontrollers
- So far no software/firmware yet, stay tuned!



## osmo\_ss7, osmo\_map, signerl

- Erlang-language SS7 implementation (MTP3, SCCP, TCAP, MAP)
- Sigtran variants (M2PA, M2UA, M3UA and SUA)
- Enables us to interface with GSM/UMTS inter-operator core network
- Already used in production in some really nasty special-purpose protocol translators (think of NAT for SS7)

# The OpenBTS Um - SIP bridge

- OpenBTS is a SDR implementation of GSM Um radio interface
- directly bridges to SIP/RTP, no A-bis/BSC/A/MSC
- suitable for research on air interface, but very different from traditional GSM networks
- work is being done to make it interoperable with OpenBSC

## airprobe.org

- SDR implementation of Um sniffer
- suitable for receiving GSM Um downlink and uplink
- predates all of the other projects
- more or less abandoned at this point

# sysmocom GmbH

systems for mobile communications

- small company, started by two Osmocom developers in Berlin
- provides commercial R&d and support for professional users of Osmocom software
- develops its own producst like sysmoBTS (inexpensive, small-form-factor, OpenBSC compatible BTS)
- runs a small webshop for Osmocom related hardware like OsmocomBB compatible phones, SIMtrace, etc.

# Where do we go from here?

- Dieter Spaar has been working with 3G NodeBs (Ericsson, Nokia) to be able to run our own RNC
- Research into intercepting microwave back-haul links
- Research into GPS simulation / transmission / faking
- Port of OsmocomBB to other baseband chips
- Low-level control from Free Software on a 3G/3.5G phone
- Re-using femtocells in creative ways
- Proprietary PMR systems

### Call for contributions

- Don't you agree that classic Internet/TCP/IP is boring and has been researched to death?
- There are many more communications systems out there
- Never trust the industry, they only care about selling their stuff
- Lets democratize access to those communication systems
- Become a contributor or developer today!
- Join our mailing lists, use/improve our code
- for OsmocomBB you only need a EUR 20 phone to start

#### **Thanks**

I'd like to thank the many Osmocom developers and contributors, especially

- Dieter Spaar
- Holger Freyther
- Andreas Eversberg
- Sylvain Munaut
- On-Waves e.h.f
- NETZING AG

#### **Thanks**

Thanks for your attention. I hope we have time for Q&A.