From 023e25f55fa1e8bcf1f23543c1f4a89941334d08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Henryk=20Pl=C3=B6tz?= Date: Tue, 12 Oct 2010 14:48:29 +0200 Subject: Typos... --- paper/easycard.tex | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/paper/easycard.tex b/paper/easycard.tex index 101ce22..cccb877 100644 --- a/paper/easycard.tex +++ b/paper/easycard.tex @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ FIXME: Describe system -- Mifare Classic + Unique keys + (online?) fraud detecti FIXME: Summarize the existing research on mifare classic systems -MIFARE Classic security came under increased scrutiny following a talk at the 24\th{} Chaos Communication Congress in December 2007 which described some of the first results of silicon reverse engineering research on the MIFARE Classic 1k chip. For reasons of responsible disclosure not all details were published, but these were then independently, and partially orthogonally, research by a group of Dutch security researchers out of Radboud University Nijmegen, fueled the rollout of a new Dutch public transport payment system based on MIFARE Classic, the OV Chipkaart. +MIFARE Classic security came under increased scrutiny following a talk at the 24$^{\textnormal{th}}$ Chaos Communication Congress in December 2007 which described some of the first results of silicon reverse engineering research on the MIFARE Classic 1k chip. For reasons of responsible disclosure not all details were initially published. These details these were then independently, and partially orthogonally, explored by a group of Dutch security researchers out of Radboud University Nijmegen, fueled by the rollout of a new Dutch public transport payment system based on MIFARE Classic, the OV Chipkaart. % Protocol- and implementation errors: RNG, keystream recovery, re-auth % Theoretical results: filter function bias, algebraic attack -- cgit v1.2.3