diff options
| author | Henryk Plötz <henryk@ploetzli.ch> | 2010-08-27 15:27:01 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Henryk Plötz <henryk@ploetzli.ch> | 2010-08-27 15:27:01 +0200 |
| commit | 5efceebb6ab59a49753f8f4b2f4e3c423d7fe6b6 (patch) | |
| tree | a9277dad6a89fb4039f5cdea8f390defb96f16ac /paper | |
| parent | 4ae8fea4271f44cc7ef34e077aee03ccc08d5d51 (diff) | |
todo: classic security
Diffstat (limited to 'paper')
| -rw-r--r-- | paper/easycard.tex | 7 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/paper/easycard.tex b/paper/easycard.tex index 1f430de..321e5ef 100644 --- a/paper/easycard.tex +++ b/paper/easycard.tex @@ -73,6 +73,13 @@ FIXME: Describe system -- Mifare Classic + Unique keys + (online?) fraud detecti FIXME: Summarize the existing research on mifare classic systems
+MIFARE Classic security came under increased scrutiny following a talk at the 24\th{} Chaos Communication Congress in December 2007 which described some of the first results of silicon reverse engineering research on the MIFARE Classic 1k chip. For reasons of responsible disclosure not all details were published, but these were then independently, and partially orthogonally, research by a group of Dutch security researchers out of Radboud University Nijmegen, fueled the rollout of a new Dutch public transport payment system based on MIFARE Classic, the OV Chipkaart.
+
+% Protocol- and implementation errors: RNG, keystream recovery, re-auth
+% Theoretical results: filter function bias, algebraic attack
+% Practical results and demo
+% Card-only attacks
+
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\section{MIFARE Classic Attack Tools}
|