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+Deepsec 2010 GSM Security Workshop
+======================================================================
+
+
+* attacks from malicious phone 
+  * RACH DoS using OsmocomBB
+  * IMSI DETACH flood 
+  * L2 fuzzing
+  * BSC fuzzing using RR messages
+  * MSC fuzzing using MM / CC messages
+  * use 'emergency call' RACH but then regular SETUP
+* passive attacks
+  * GSM intercept using airprobe
+  * extended GSM intercept with A5/1 decryption
+
+* best security practises when deploying GSM
+  * TMSI reallocation as often as possible
+  * VLR large enough to never expire VLR records
+  * offer A5/3 
+  * don't offer A5/2
+  * randomized padding of L2 frames
+  * encrypted/authenticated backhaul
+  * heuristics-based IMSI DETACH protection or DETACH disable
+  * use 'late assignment' of TCH
+  * use SMS over GPRS whenever possible
+  * do SDCCH-reassignment on CS-SMS
+  * always use frequency hopping over wide spectrum
+  * make SI5/SI6 on SACCH less predictable
+  * offer GEA3 and use whenever possible
+
+
+In recent years, we have seen a significant increase of research in GSM
+protocol-level and cryptographic security attacks:  The existing theoretical
+weaknesses of A5/1 have been implemented and proven as practical, rainbow
+tables have been computed and distributed widely on the internet.  A new
+open-source GSM baseband software facilitates fine-grained control over all
+information sent from a malicious user, enabling protocol fuzzing and flooding
+attacks.
+
+However, the publicly available attack tools are hard to use, and it is
+difficult to reproduce the published attacks and assess how easy it is to
+perform which type of attack on GSM networks.
+
+This two-day workshop will re-visit all GSM security features and their
+publicly know weaknesses.  It will introduce and demonstrate the various
+publicly available attack tools;  Workshop participants will be trained
+by the creators of the attack tools on how to use them against actual GSM
+networks.
+
+After extensive hands-on sessions performing the various attacks,
+counter-measures will be presented, followed by a discussion of the best
+current practises for configuring a secure-as-possible GSM network.
+
+The target audience of this workshop is GSM network operators and IT security
+consultants in the telecommunications industry.